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The quality of the systems engineering and the early Mercury program to the mature
integration (SE&I) process determines the and structured process used for Apollo. The
viability, effectiveness and the survivability flight experience of the Mercury program re-
of major NASA flight programs. In mission vealed the need for a deeper knowledge of
operations, SE&I is the process by which the spacecraft systems by flight operations
technical, operational, economic and politi- teams. It further indicated a need for
cal aspects of programs are integrated to systems documentation tailored to the opera-
support the program objectives and require- tor's real-time task. By the completion of
ments consistent with sound engineering, Mercury, a systems handbook had been
design and operations management princi- developed as an "on-console," real-time docu-
plea. ment for flight systems data. Direct commu-
Major flight programs involve operation- nication was established between the operat-
al, cost, and political elements and priorities, ing team and the manufacturer so that any
international prerogatives, and often poorly additional systems data needed during the
focused utilization requirements, in addition course of the mission could be obtained. This
to traditional technical trades, technology communication also provided a means for
utilization, and interface definition and con- getting engineering judgment on operational
trol. This combination demands an effective trades, whenever time permitted. The flight
SE&I process that spans and involves all rules became the focus of operational poli-
these elements, cies.
SE&I, therefore, is a distributed process The Gemini program required the devel-
that involves the structuring and integrated opment of the trajectory capabilities needed
management of a program within and be- for rendezvous and docking, as well as a
tween the program, project and technical guided reentry capability. These require-
levels, with a life cycle consistent with the ments established the linkage between tra-
program phase. SE&I must anticipate pro- jectory; guidance, navigation and control
gram needs by providing clear technical (GNC) systems; and propulsive consumables.
assessments, trades and alternatives aimed The Gemini extravehicular activity (EVA)
at satisfying the program objectives and increased awareness of the relationship be-
requirements, tween crew, the task and the working envi-
This paper will describe the key princi- ronment.
plea and processes used within mission oper- During Apollo, science became the final
ations, emphasizing the pre-mission prep- mission component supported by the oper-
aration activities most useful for describing ations teams. The Apollo operations team
the principles of an effective SE&I process, worked in an integrated fashion on all issues
involving flight systems, flight design,
EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF MISSION science and manned operations.
OPERATIONS It was during the Skylab program that
the first formal and broad-scale application
The development of mission operations capa- of the mission operations (SE&I) process
bilities for manned space flight involved a emerged to support the early flight system
rapid evolution from the traditional method hardware and software design. During the
of aircraft flight test operations used during Skylab design reviews, many of the review
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item discrepancies (RIDs) revealed the need
for much closer relations between systems
design and operational utilization.
The multiple Skylab systems elements,
combined with the broad spectrum of scienti-
fic objectives and the complexity of manned
and unmanned flight, required an early and
effective relationship between flight systems
designer, scientist-user and mission oper-
ations. A Johnson Space Center (JSC) oper-
ations team and a Marshall Space Flight
Center (MSFC) engineering team joined to
conduct a series of systems operations com-
patibility assessment reviews (SOCARs).
During these and all subsequent reviews, the
Skylab systems and software handbooks pro-
duced by mission operations were used as the
baseline reference documentation for the
SOCAR. These documents were also used by
the JSC and MSFC teams for the flight phase
of the program. Skylab real-time operations
demonstrated the effectiveness of this rela-
tionship between the JSC and MSFC teams.
The mission operations team supported
the design and development phase of the
Space Shuttle program at the program and
project levels and helped develop operational
workarounds for flight systems and software
deficiencies that could not be corrected be-
fore the flight test phase of the program.
MISSION OPERATIONS STRUCTURE
The Mission Operations Directorate (MOD)
at the Johnson Space Center is highly inte-
grated and structured around the principal
skills needed for mission preparation, plan-
ning, training, reconfiguration, facility de-
velopment, facility operations and real-time
flight operations_
Each mission operations element consists
of a single functional discipline, e.g., mission
design, flight systems, reconfiguration,
training, etc. Usually each organizational
element is structured to provide dedicated
support to either the Shuttle or Space Sta-
tion. This is believed to be the best way for
assuring accountability in individuals and
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management, avoiding conflicting priorities
and providing leadership focus. The only
exception is a Flight Design and Dynamics
Division (FDDD), which provides integrated
flight design for the Shuttle and all pro-
grams using Shuttle services.
Each division is responsible for integra-
tion within its work area and provides
mission operations representation to the
project-level boards. Program-level boards
are generally supported through the Flight
Director Office, by the Operations Division
and by the FDDD. Integration between pro-
grams is accomplished by the MOD assistant
directors for the Shuttle and for the Space
Station.
In addition to the internal integration
process, each division generally has a hori-
zontal integration responsibility that identi-
fies, collects and documents the capabilities
and constraints imposed by other elements.
This integration process frequently incorpo-
rates participants external to mission oper-
ations (for example, participants from the
program and the project), as well as the
flight system contractor and the payload
user. In most cases, this is accomplished by
mission operations directed panels that are
chartered by the program.
INTRODUCTION TO MISSION OPERATIONS
SE&I
This paper will discuss three mission oper-
ations functions that are illustrative of the
key principles of operations SE&I and of the
processes and products involved.
• The flight systems process was selected to
illustrate the role of the systems product
line in developing the depth and cross-
disciplinary skills needed for SE&I and
providing the foundation for dialogue
between participating elements.
• FDDD was selected to illustrate the need
for a structured process to assure that
SE&I provides complete and accurate
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results that consistently support program
needs.
The flight director's role in mission oper-
ations was selected to illustrate the com-
plexity of the risk/gain tradeoffs involved
in the development of the flight tech-
niques and flight rules process as well as
the absolute importance of the leadership
role in developing the technical, oper-
ational, and political trades.
Flight Systems Division SE&I
The early Mercury program employed a mix-
ture of operations and engineering personnel
to support the real-time operations. Later,
flight experience established the need for a
full-time systems operations team. The need
for an integrated compilation of flight sys-
tem data usable by the crew and ground
team for real-time operations led to early
versions of the systems handbooks that are
the foundation for today's handbooks. Rudi-
mentary integrated schematics were used for
Gemini, but with the Apollo program came
more complex inflight computing capability.
Consequently, the schematics were expand-
ed to define the computer interfaces and used
significantly more of the vehicle design and
performance data base within the schematic
notes.
As mentioned earlier, the schematics
were used for the first time to support the
Skylab critical design reviews and the
SOCAR. During these reviews, program and
project management recognized that the sys-
tems operations teams and the systems
handbooks were an SE&I asset. The modu-
larity of the SkyIab elements, along with the
integrated nature of the systems, established
the pre-mission role for the systems hand-
books to support the flight system design
review process as an integrated activity. The
usefulness of the handbooks in addressing
integrated systems issues was thus formally
established. For the Apollo Soyuz Test Pro-
gram (ASTP), and the Shuttle and Spacelab
programs, the preliminary version of the
mission operations schematics were complet-
ed prior to the flight system critical design
review (CDR) and were used as the founda-
tion for the mission operations assessments.
The Systems Handbook Today
Mission operations schematics are developed
by the controllers to a common set of internal
drafting standards and conventions and use
the design engineering drawings, vendor
schematics and software source code. For the
Shuttle, operations personnel were required
to develop Houston Aerospace Language/
Shuttle software language skills as a job
requirement. Permanent, prime contractor,
in-house and implant support assures the
flow of the raw design data and provides the
communications conduit between the sys-
tems operations personnel and the prime
contractor design engineers so they can ad-
dress questions as they arise. After the STS-
51L accident, all handbook schematics were
expanded to provide direct traceability to
design drawings by title, drawing number,
revision and date.
The systems controllers who develop the
schematics derive significant training from
using design data and translating this data
into an operationally useful format. The
schematic development and the integration
of data from supporting systems and subsys-
tems provides independent validation of the
system design intent. In particular, it identi-
fies issues where the integrated design may
have compromised the program intent. The
drawing configuration control process re-
quires verification by section and branch
chiefs and final approval by the division
chief. Formal reviews are conducted before
major handbook releases. As a result, the op-
erator and the supervisory chain derive a
training benefit from the systems handbook
process.
The systems handbooks are used by
crews, flight directors, training instructors
and mission operations payload support per-
sonnel. They are a formal portion of training
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documentation and are carried in the Shuttle
flight data file. The schematics support
airborne system troubleshooting and provide
a common base for the crew and the ground
to discuss suspected problems and follow-on
actions. They provide the basis for MOD dis-
cussion with the contractor engineering
team and with the mission support team.
Flight Procedures. The development of the
systems handbook provided the foundation
for the development of flight procedures.
Three basic categories of flight procedures
are developed: the operations checklists, the
pocket checklists and the malfunction proce-
dures.
The operations checklist procedures allow
the crew and ground systems operations to
accomplish a planned activity and are nor-
mally developed as blocks of integrated sys-
tems activities; for example, aligning the
inertial measurement unit. Procedures de-
velopment requires intimate familiarity
with the system; its interfaces, controls, and
displays; and with the intended task to be
accomplished. Operations checklist proce-
dures cross all systems and technical disci-
plines, and as a result of their development,
provide another level of systems integration
and design validation. Procedures associated
with an Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem
burn, for example, involve loading the ma-
neuver targets into the computer, selecting
and configuring engines for the burn, acti-
vating the correct digital autopilot, selecting
displays, and specifying of data to be record-
ed.
Pocket checklists are emergency proce-
dures based on the operations checklist. The
term "pocket" is used because the checklists
must be readily available for critical mission
phases and are sized to be carried by the crew
in the pockets of their flight suits.
The pocket checklist procedures define
the steps to be taken when an unplanned
event occurs. These procedures address
critical failures and are flight-phase unique.
They require knowledge of system perfor-
mance limits, crew capabilities, failure
modes, and crew and ground response times.
The emergency procedures therefore provide
a bridge from operations checklist proce-
dures into options that allow the crew to con-
tinue the current flight phase with modifica-
tion, to reconfigure to recover capabilities, or
to utilize an alternate capability. Figure 1 is
a typical procedure used during powered
flight for a main B undervolt condition.
The final type of flight procedures devel-
oped by the controllers are the malfunction
procedures (MALS), which are used when
time is available to troubleshoot, locate and
define the boundaries of problems that occur
inflight. To solve the problem, the crew and
ground use the full range of instrumentation
available and any visual or external cues
available. The procedures are developed in a
logical format using a series of "if," "and,"
and "or" statements. Warning notes are pro-
vided, as well as permissive steps when
ground and crew consultation is required pri-
or to continuing the procedural sequence.
These procedures have allowed the correct
isolation of the majority of inflight problems
for the Shuttle program.
A final category of flight procedures con-
cern payload operations and involve multiple
flight elements.
Flight Systems Organizations. Since
Gemini, the MOD flight systems organiza-
tions have been structured to address a
complete space system. Examples include
command service module, lunar module and
Shuttle. Each section within an organization
has responsibility for an assigned system,
with its subsystems, software, instrumen-
tation, display, crew controls, command
controls, procedures, mechanical, power,
cooling, and thermal and consumable inter-
faces. During the Skylab program, each or-
ganization also had to know about inflight
maintenance and support logistics.
The systems organizations of the MOD
participate in flight systems design via for-
mal membership on the working groups,
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panels and boards established by the pro-
gram office. During the early design phase,
they establish the data base for the develop-
ment of schematics and procedures for the
flight controllers. Because of this, direct con-
tractor liaison is maintained within the
MOD systems organization and in-plant.
Development of the mission product line
by the systems flight controllers increases
their skills and knowledge. In addition, the
product line focuses the operations assess-
ments of overall flight system architecture
and provides the foundation for subsequent
steps. Finally, as a recognized product, it is
used by several groups in support of their
individual responsibilities. Program SE&I
products typically must exhibit the same
characteristics--they must pass the value-
added test.
The systems operations contribution to
the early design and eventual operation of
the flight system has been essential in assur-
ing safe, effective and functional system
capability for space flight. The perspective of
the systems operator provides the cross-
disciplinary assessment needed to assure ef-
fective overall systems engineering and
integration. This perspective is the corner-
stone of the real-time capability of the man-
ned spaceflight operations team.
Flight Design Division SE&I
The flight design process involves the inte-
gration of payload and engineering require-
ments with mission objectives to form an
integrated mission design. The flight design
must satisfy both Shuttle system design and
payload design constraints while considering
the additional constraints imposed in consid-
eration of safe mission conduct and mission
success.
The flight design process is a critical node
in the Shuttle mission preparation process.
In addition to flight design, the process
provides initialization data for the ground
149
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Figure 2 Flight Design Template
facilities, Shuttle primary and backup soft-
ware, flight and payload planning, and real-
time decision support products.
Within the flight design and dynamics
discipline there are three mission phase ana-
lysis and design work areas--ascent, orbit
and descent--and one functional area--real-
time operations. The FDD, working in
coordination with other mission operations
elements, establishes and integrates the
propulsive and non-propulsive consumables,
abort propellant dump analysis, and manip-
ulator requirements and analysis into the
overall flight design. The overall integration
of activities supporting a mission is provided
by a flight design manager.
The flight design process acquires a vast
amount of input data from a wide variety of
sources. The input data for the early phase of
the program is typical specification data, but
during the operational phase of the program
it becomes highly flight specific and fre-
quently component specific. A good example
would be constraints for engine throttling
related to a specific Space Shuttle Main
Engine turbo pump.
Flight Design Cycles. The flight design
process has three principal cycles designed to
satisfy the requirements and lead times of
the many users. The conceptual flight profile
cycle provides the program office with data
150
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for making commitments to the payload
customers and assessing the overall suitabil-
ity of the operations flight design approach.
The engineering cycle supports the ini-
tialization of the engineering and test facili-
ties as well as the initial shuttle mission
simulator (SMS) training load. The flight
cycle supports MCC and SMS initialization
for final training and operations, Kennedy
Space Center (KSC) Launch Processing
System checkout and launch support, God-
dard Space Flight Center network support,
and range safety. The flight design cycles are
under review to determine if a single cycle
could be used to satisfy all user require-
ments. This latter objective requires signifi-
cant standardization within the program,
improved and timely provision of payload
specific data and significant training stan-
dardization.
Flight Design Documentation. The flight
design process is the last of the mission oper-
ations processes to be documented as a
structured flow from the conceptual phase
through the delivery of the launch-loads
used for flight. The full documentation of
these processes is now contained in 22 vol-
umes of flight design handbooks. Documen-
tation was undertaken to serve four distinct
objectives: (1) document the corporate mem-
ory of this process before it is lost; (2) estab-
lish an error- and omission-free process,
necessary because of the critical nature and
use of the flight design products; (3) support
the design of an integrated computing sys-
tem as an aid to support the flight design
process; and (4) assure consistent design and
rationale between similar missions.
The two years after the STS-51L accident
were used to safe the flight design system,
document the process and initiate a multi-
year plan for code conversion, consolidation,
documentation and configuration control of
all applications software. Process flow charts
were developed for every activity involved in
the flight design analysis and production
activity.
The flight design handbooks developed
during recent years have documented the
flight design SE&I process and, to a great
extent, represent the structure and relation-
ships that must exist to incorporate integrat-
ed trajectory design into any space program.
These documents are invaluable examples of
the structure and approach needed for fur-
ther space exploration activity. They also
provide a good textbook for personnel in-
volved in SE&I management to describe the
relation between trajectory, systems, soft-
ware and objective data. In addition, they
define input/output requirements, integra-
tion nodes, audit points and interfaces to
external elements for data acquisition and
transfer.
An Illustration of the Flight Design Pro-
cess. The integration of the constraints im-
posed by the flight system, environment,
payload and operations in the determination
of the launch window will be used to illus-
trate one aspect of the flight design process.
The launch window is the time period
that the Shuttle should launch to achieve
precise program requirements. This activity
is described in the flight design handbook via
three processes that satisfy Shuttle and
payload requirements. These processes are
further combined and iterated to develop the
integrated launch window. This initial step
of the process provides input data for subse-
quent planning involving deorbit opportuni-
ties, sequence of events, pointing, thermal
assessments and so forth.
The constraints imposed in launch win-
dow determination represent the broad
range of considerations faced by the flight
designer in this task. Where practicable,
priorities are established to assist the flight
designer. The actual development of the
launch window analyses is governed by a 27-
page procedure within the flight design
handbook.
Flight design is an essential element for
space flight. The documentation of this pro-
cess captured what was in the minds of the
15l
READINGS IN SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
talented and imaginative individuals work-
ing in this field, and provided the definitive
text for future flight design work for space
exploration.
For the Space Station Freedom program,
MOD has developed process flow charts for
all functions that describe the input/output
activities within mission operations and be-
tween mission operations and the Level II
program elements, MSFC, KSC, GSFC and
international partners. These flow charts de-
scribed interfaces, product exchanges and
work templates. They were used to define the
roles and mission boundaries needed for sus-
tained and effective relationships between
participants. Documentation of the SE&I
process is absolutely essential to clear and
effective role and responsibility definition,
and is a primary step in minimizing jurisdic-
tional battles between SE&I elements.
Flight Directors SE&I
The mission operations SE&I process uses
the Flight Director Office to provide the top
level, multidisciplinary integration, risk/
gain assessment and validation of the inte-
grated mission preparation.
Flight directors are selected from the
ranks of MOD personnel. Selection is based
on leadership, technical abilities, stability
and judgment as established by their perfor-
mance during flight operations. They are
already intimately familiar with the operat-
ing disciplines, interfaces, flight and ground
systems capabilities, crew capabilities and
the mission risk/gain process. The challenge
for the flight directors is acquiring and
maintaining the clear perspective needed for
multidisciplinary technical, operational and
political trades and leading the many di-
verse elements to operationally correct risk/
gain decisions.
The lead flight director is central to the
process for the assigned missions.
Pre-CDR Support. Support to a program
from the Flight Director Office is initiated
between the preliminary design reviews
(PDRs) and CDRs. This phase is character-
ized by major tradeoffs between program
requirements, flight system design, crew and
ground and customer roles, schedule and
cost. During this period the flight director,
supported by all mission operations ele-
ments, refines the operating 'concepts and
leads the operational trades involving auton-
omy, fault tolerance, crew and ground func-
tions, and flight design and payload suppor-
tability. As flight system design becomes
more focused during this period, the program
costs and the real world design trades con-
verge and program tradeoffs must be imple-
mented. As a result, the mission operations
integration process is initiated to provide the
program and project managers with a clear
understanding of available options. The op-
tions are generally provided by in the form of
operations compatibility studies, similar to
the SOCARs described previously, or in the
form of an integrated mission design assess-
ment.
CDR Support. The CDR support to the
program from the mission operations team is
significantly different because of the avail-
ability of the mission operations flight
systems handbooks and the increased knowl-
edge of the team. The operations team has
acquired significant experience in working
with the program and project as a member of
the change control board (CCB) and through
the CCB processes. The CDR represents a
milestone for reassessing the design and is
frequently the first time that the maturity of
the software begins to approach the maturity
of the hardware.
The principal contribution from mission
operations during this time is in the detailed
operational suitability assessments. These
assessments concern the mission suitability
of the flight system design and involve pro-
gram requirements, hardware and software
design, mission design, and crew and ground
capabilities. Through these assessments the
preliminary risk/gain trades and fault down
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options are established, operating philos-
ophies are defined and mission options ascer-
tained. Within mission operations, the CDR
is not a discrete process. It is considered one
of the many milestones of a process charac-
terized by an increasing involvement by
operations personnel in the change boards
and control mechanisms established by the
program. The involvement extends to the
flight preparation period, which has two dis-
tinct processes and products representative
of the flight director's role in the mission
operations SE&I. These processes involve
flight techniques and flight rules.
Flight Techniques. The initial flight tech-
niques process was developed, and since
Apollo, has been chartered by the Level II
program. The process was established to
address the growing complexity of the inter-
action between flight software, flight system
and flight objectives. This process provided
the technical focus for the operations, engi-
neering and contractor teams to address the
use of the as-built flight system, the soft-
ware, and the crew and ground capabilities
in accomplishing flight objectives. During
Apollo, the ground system, flight procedures
and flight software were the only elements
that could be readily changed within cost
and schedule considerations. The flight tech-
niques process, assisted by Draper Laborato-
ries and the operational vehicle and software
developers, established virtually all of the
navigation capabilities for Apollo. They
developed the technique for the Apollo 12
pinpoint landing and were a principal contri-
butor to the Apollo 13 return.
The product line of the techniques process
is initially the series of detailed meeting
minutes, which provide the basis for flight
procedures and the rationale for the majority
of the flight rules and mission design con-
straints. The flight techniques process pro-
vides the integration of the knowledge base
available on the flight system to drive flight
designs, procedures and flight rules.
Flight Rules. Flight rules are the funda-
mental risk/gain policy document for mis-
sion conduct. The "flight rules outline
preplanned decisions to minimize the
amount of real-time rationalization required
when non-nominal situations occur from the
start of the terminal countdown through
crew egress."
The most complex, difficult and critical of
the integration processes provided by the
Flight Director Office is flight rules develop-
ment. Flight rules used today trace their
beginnings to aircraft flight tests. Rudimen-
tary guidelines were provided for the flight
test pilots relative to test conditions, and go-
no-go criteria were provided for test continu-
ation or termination. Similarly, during
Mercury the rules for selected systems fail-
ures were also a simple set of go-no-go crite-
ria involving powered flight abort and
mission continuation or termination. Rules
also addressed the control center, network
and flight instrumentation requirements.
Today's flight rules involve sophisticated
risk/gain trades across redundant systems,
multiple mission phases, engineering and
payload objectives, and crew and controller
capabilities. They also reflect and tradeoff
the payload objectives, crew adaptation and
flight system survivability in defining mis-
sion duration for off-normal conditions.
Additionally, they clearly define the respon-
sibilities of key personnel implementing
flight operations.
While the rules are infinitely more com-
plex, the principle of the rules remains the
same; that is, "to establish the risk versus
gain trades" before the mission, utilizing the
full range of operational, program and engi-
neering judgment available in the pre-
mission environment.
To assure complete visibility to all trade-
offs involved in the flight rules, rule ratio-
nale, techniques data and Systems Oper-
ations Data Book (SODB), references are
contained in the published rules. The SODB
and its variants were developed during
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Gemini by mission operators with support by
the prime contractor for the purpose of docu-
menting the performance capabilities and
limitations of the flight system. Since
Apollo, the SODB has been maintained by
the prime contractor, with mission oper-
ations as the primary user.
The leadership function provided by the
flight director, using the flight techniques
and flight rules process, provides the focus
for the integration of flight-specific work
within mission operations.
The rules and rationale section in the all-
flights document is almost 900 pages. The
flight-specific annex published for each
mission is about 70 pages. It is provided to
address the flight-unique objective and
payload risk/gain trades for each specific
mission, flight objective and payload ele-
ment.
Flight directors, like program and project
managers, depend on a matrix structure of
organizations to accomplish their responsi-
bilities. The flight directors are consistently
successful because their roles are well
defined, and because the integration tech-
niques are facilitated by the MOD organiza-
tion structure as well as by clearly defined
product line and support processes. These
characteristics must exist to successfully
cope with the complex issues imposed by all
mission elements.
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PRINCIPAL REQUIREMENTS OF AN
EFFECTIVE SE&I PROCESS
The mission operations elements, processes,
and products are oriented to the singular ob-
jective of safe and successful manned flight
operations. The spacecraft on the drawing
board, like the ship in a harbor, is a safe
ship, but that is not what spacecraft and
ships are for. The mission operations job is to
take the spacecraft from the harbor of the
drawing board into space, accomplish a mis-
sion and then safely return the spacecraft to
Earth.
In recognition of this responsibility, the
mission operations processes are structured
to assure effective policy, objective, system
and operations integration. Within this
framework, complex risk/gain trades are
conducted and validated at all levels, culmi-
nating in a completely independent and
dynamic assessment and stress test during
the integrated training process.
The mission operations process can illus-
trate the principles necessary to a successful
SE&I. It is believed that these principles are
useful to other SE&I elements that have the
responsibility for NASA flight programs at
the project and program level.
1. SE&I must have necessary roles and
missions that are clearly defined by the pro-
gram and implemented by the project and
technical organizations.
SE&I is necessary because the integra-
tion processes needed to address the techni-
cal, operational, political and economic
aspects of major programs are complex.
The value-added principle is the basic
test that should be used in determining role
and mission assignments.
SE&I by its nature will be controversial
and participating elements may stonewall
the process. When this occurs, the program,
project or technical manager must quickly
and personally address the issue, establish a
program position and demand the support
required.
2. SE&I must utilize the existing capabil-
ities of organizations.
SE&I is the "integration" of the techni-
cal, operational, economic and political as-
pects needed to support a major program.
The broad range of work, skills required and
complexity of issues virtually precludes the
development of a single SE&I organization
for a major program. SE&I responsibility
must be distributed to be successful.
3. SE&I elements must recognize and ac-
cept that major and complex programs will
involve technical, operational, political and
economic needs.
Major programs must address and sup-
port the needs of the various constituencies
involved in establishing the program and
must consider all of the economic issues
involved in program development and
operations. This recognition is essential if
NASA and its contractors are to develop a
more flexible and responsive approach to
program management.
4. SE&I must have a process-based struc-
ture and a defined product line and life cycle.
The complexity of SE&I requires a struc-
tured process to assure all interfaces are ad-
dressed, proper responsibilities assigned,
and SE&I is effectively mechanized. SE&I
requires a solid grasp of all the elements to
be brought together, where the elements
logically come from, where they fit in the
sequence, what the end product is and what
the alternatives are.
SE&I can be accomplished by a few gifted
people for a limited time, but without
structured processes, SE&I will become
inefficient, outputs will not meet schedule
commitments, "more integration resources
will be needed, and the downward spiral will
begin." SE&I is not provided by massive ap-
plication of resources. It comes about by
structured processes that clearly establish
the roles and responsibilities of the support-
ing elements and use them effectively.
The SE&I process definition is also used
to establish the product line of participating
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elements and define input/output require-
ments. This product line must be phased to
the life cycle of the program.
5. SE&I leadership must exist within all
elements of the SE&I process structure and
must be clearly recognized and accepted by
the assigned individuals and their organiza-
tions.
Accepting an SE&I leadership role is to
recognize and accept conflict, particularly in
the project and technical organizations.
Organizations assigned an SE&I role must
recognize and accept the technical, oper-
ational, political and economic implications
of the SE&I role. SE&I must address the
needs of the program, which must supersede
the needs of individuals and organizations.
SE&I within NASA's flight programs is a
constantly evolving and complex process
involving many conflicting requirements
that must be brought together to support
program needs throughout the program's life
cycle. An SE&I process that is effectively
structured with distributed responsibilities
will support program needs and recognize
many of the prerogatives of the existing
NASA elements. Each complex program,
however, will have some elements that do
not fit neatly into the existing NASA
infrastructure because of economic, political
or other considerations. SE&I will always be
controversial, in structure and in implemen-
tation.
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